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The Centralization of Power: A Closer Look at Article 356
Article 356 was designed as a constitutional safeguard, intended to be used judiciously. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar envisioned it largely remaining inactive, but the reality has diverged significantly from that hope. The architects of the Indian Constitution accepted an inherent bias towards a unitary system, prioritizing national unity over provincial autonomy. Unlike American states, Indian provinces were never granted true sovereign status, lacking the residual powers and equal representation in governance that characterize their American counterparts.
By the time legal expert Nani Palkhivala began addressing this issue, the fears articulated by Ambedkar had materialized. In the early decades of India’s republic, President's rule was imposed in every state except Sikkim. During a 1972 lecture in Mumbai, Palkhivala highlighted the gradual erosion of states' constitutional positions due to excessive centralization, arguing that their powers—once robust in areas like industry and trade—had been diminished to the point where states were weaker than even the second-class princely states of the colonial era.
Palkhivala contended that this distortion of federalism was evident not only in political practice but also reflected in the language used to discuss the constitutional framework. He pointed out that the Constitution refers to a “Union” of states, not a “Centre” exerting unchallenged authority. This popular notion of a dominating Centre, he argued, fundamentally contradicts the intended constitutional scheme, which should see states as meaningful and autonomous entities within the federal landscape.
As Palkhivala observed, the powers granted under Article 356 became tools for political centralization, allowing the Union government to step in and enforce President’s rule if it deemed that a state could not function according to constitutional norms. This intervention often hinged on reports from Governors, who are political appointees representing the Union and wielding significant control over state affairs.
A comprehensive study released in 2024 by researchers Christian Bjørnskov, Shruti Rajagopalan, and colleagues investigated every instance of President's rule from 1952 to 2019—totaling 123 cases across 26 states. Their findings echoed Palkhivala’s warnings: President's rule was rarely implemented in response to crises like riots or natural disasters, but rather served as a weapon for the Union to assert control over state governments.
The judiciary eventually intervened to mitigate the misuse of this power. In the landmark case SR Bommai v Union of India (1994), the Supreme Court affirmed its authority to review whether the President's actions, including those based on a Governor's report, justified a takeover of state governance. The Court mandated that any test of government majority should occur on the floor of the State Assembly, rather than being dictated by the Governor, leading to a significant decrease in the arbitrary use of President’s Rule.
Palkhivala’s concerns extended beyond mere legal provisions; he viewed federalism as a vital structural check against the concentration of power in the capital. He famously argued that states should have “the right to go wrong in freedom rather than go right in the thralldom to the Centre.” In his view, a genuine federal structure should never nullify the voters’ mandate at the state level.
For Palkhivala, the frequent and arbitrary application of President’s rule warranted deep scrutiny, justifiable only in dire circumstances where law and order had completely broken down. While the Supreme Court has established safeguards against the political exploitation of state emergencies, the Governor's office still possesses considerable discretionary power under the Constitution.
Today, Palkhivala’s insights remain pertinent. A republic’s endurance relies not only on legal frameworks but also on public vigilance, political accountability, and respect for the Constitution's essence. The Centre’s overwhelming power has been a deliberate design since India's formation, justified during the state’s formative years. However, the abuse of national emergencies and President’s rule has demonstrated the dangers of such consolidation. To honor the true spirit of the Constitution, we must reinforce checks and balances that prevent the extreme concentration of power, promoting a vision of federalism where states are treated as equal partners, rather than mere subordinates to the Centre.
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